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1 • Policy Perspectives: Problems, Goals and Tools 
The mid 1980s represented a turning point in dairy 
policy. The basis for support price adjustments officially 
changed from being parity based to being driven by the 
level of governm~nt purchases. To moderate support 
price adjustments, voluntary production control pro-
grams, similar to those existing in crops, paid dairy 
farmers to reduce production. A portion of the costs of 
these programs was born by assessments on farmer 
milk sales. This combination of actions finally reduced 
the level of government stocks and purchases to 
tolerable levels in 1987. These policies were pursued 
despite considerable pain to many dairymen. Were it 
not for strong commercial sales spurred by advertising 
programs, prices would have fallen even further. 
Discussions of policy goals and the implications of 
program options have become increasingly prominent 
in dairy policy debates. Whether or not they address the 
goals explicitly or implicitly in coming policy develop-
ment, policy makers will set a course for dairy programs 
that could determine how and how well the dairy sector 
will adjust to the technological and economic changes it 
will undergo in the future. 
Problems and Goals Prior to the 1980s 
The architects of New Deal agricultural policy 
identified a key farm problem-low prices. Their one 
objective was to raise farm prices to 100 percent of 
parity, a goal originally sought through a form of 
production controls. What emerged by the late 1930s 
was a dairy policy that largely embraced the goals and 
enforced the pricing procedures that cooperatives could 
not m a int a in on their own. Federal orders 
enhanced the bargaining power of farmers and en-
forced a more equal distribution of returns to farmers. 
Even so, orders were not able to raise farm prices and 
maintain secure markets to the satisfaction of dairy 
farm interests. 
The next major attempt to raise farm prices occurred 
during World War II as part of a larger effort to 
stimulate food production. After the war, with the 
influx of young men anxious to return to the farm, it 
was deemed necessary to legislate a permanent program 
that helped to ensure adequate returns and secure 
markets to existing and new generations of dairy 
farmers. The Agricultural Act of 1949 authorized the 
Secretary of Agriculture to support farm prices at no 
less than 75 percent of parity and no more than 90 
percent of parity. This defined in practice, if not in 
principle, the boundaries of adequate returns and 
reasonable prices. Anything more precise than that was 
left to the discretion of the Secretary. Stable and secure 
markets were essentially guaranteed by the manner 
in which farm prices were supported. The program 
required the USDA to buy manufactured dairy products 
at wholesale prices designed to give manufacturers 
enough money to cover their costs and pay farmers the 
equivalent of the support price. In so doing, the 
program increases in support essentially allowed the 
USDA not only to raise prices but also to guarantee a 
secure and essentially unlimited outlet for market 
surpluses. To be sure, not every farmer or processor 
had a guaranteed outlet for his or her product, but 
USDA's willingness to purchase any quantity of cheese, 
butter and nonfat dry milk at a given price came just 
one step short of that. 
From 1949 through 1978, under the traditional 
purchase program, annual net removals on a milk 
equivalent basis averaged four percent of total milk 
marketings. This implies that the operational goal of 
the support program is to support farm prices slightly 
above levels that would perfectly balance commercial 
supply and demand, resulting in a perennial, but fairly 
small surplus. It is evident that both price enhancement 
and stabilization have been important goals in the 
administration of the price support program, but prior 
to 1979, price enhancement goals were clearly tempered 
by some sensitivity to market conditions. 
Policy goals across agriculture shifted perceptibly 
during the 1970s. Reliance on intervention was replaced 
by faith in demand-induced growth stemming largely 
from greater agricultural exports. Although cash grain · 
farmers prospered during this period, dairy farmers 
fared poorly as feed prices increased while support 
prices increased slowly and reluctantly. Between 1973 
and 1975 domestic production was less than commercial 
disappearance, import quotas were greatly expanded to 
. make up the shortfall, and net removals averaged only 
one percent of production. In 1976, President Carter 
fulfilled a campaign pledge to increase the support 
price for milk. Congress followed by enacting legislation 
in 1977 and 1979 that required milk prices to be 
supported at no less than 80 percent of parity, with 
semi-annual adjustments. Thus, the course was set for a 
level of enhancement unparalleled in the 30-year history 
of the program. 
The shift in the mid-1970s from a very free, market-
oriented policy to one of enhancing farm milk prices 
occurred primarily for political reasons. Dairy farmers 
who felt they had been short-changed during the Nixon 
administration convinced President Carter and Congress 
that they deserved compensating treatment. High parity 
prices and cost data convinced Congress that milk 
prices were not keeping up with production costs. 
Whatever relationship these high parity prices may 
have had to costs, they proved to be totally inconsistent 
with market supply and demand. Parity had become 
unreliable as a guide for setting support prices. 
Current Problems and Policy Goals 
Since 1980, the dairy industry has struggled to get 
surpluses and government spending under control. 
Congress grappled with and changed dairy policy nearly 
every year between 1980 and 1985. Each new policy has 
been a bit harsher than the prior one. In April 1981, the 
semi-annual price increase required under legislation 
was suspended. In December 1981, support prices were 
essentially severed from the parity standard. Although 
not related to parity, small annual increases in support 
prices were permitted in the 1981 Agriculture and Food 
Act. In 1982, it became apparent that even the first 
small increase was unwarranted, given growing sur-
pluses. Amendments were added to the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1982, which froze the support 
price at the level it had been since October 1980, and 
the Secretary was granted authority to assess farmers 
directly to help offset some of the program costs. 
Assessments of 50 cents per cwt of milk marketed were 
begun as a first experiment in program cost sharing. 
The first assessment was nonrefundable; the second 
was refundable to farmers who reduced their marketings. 
In November 1983, a four-point compromise, reflecting 
each of the major proposals that had been advanced to 
deal with surplus conditions, was adopted. The Dairy 
Production Stabilization Act combined price cuts, a 
mandatory assessment, a mandatory promotion program 
funded by farmer assessments, and a "milk diversion 
program" which offered cash payments to farmers who 
agreed to market less milk than they bad during a base 
period. It would appear that when surpluses first began 
to grow, Congress tried to do as little as possible, 
addressing first the principal budget concerns. 
After a discouraging experience with the only 
temporarily effective diversion program in 1984 and 
1985, unprecedented production and USDA removals 
prompted the Congress to pass the Food Security Act of 
1985. This Act established a two part dairy program. 
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The first part contained a voluntary Dairy Termination 
Program (DTP) which brought farmers out df pro-
duction for a five year period. The second part included 
a supply-demand adjuster that moved the support level 
up or down as USDA removals fell or increased. 
The goal of the 1985 Act was to eliminate 12 billion 
pounds of milk during the 18 month exit period. The 
exit period was divided into three herd buyout periods. 
The exit period began on April 1, 1986 and ended 
September 30, 1987. Production for calendar 1985 
totaled 143.15 billion pounds production, for 1986 
totaled 143.38 billion pounds, and calendar 1987 
production totaled 142.46 billion pounds. The 12 billion 
pound goal was reached in terms of the milk production 
base established at the beginning of the DTP. 
The second part of the 1985 fixed support levels for 
the period January 1, 1986 through December 31, 1986 
at $11.60 /cwt for milk at 3.67 percent butterfat. For 
January 1, 1987 through September 30, 1987, the 
support price was set at $11.35. From October 1, 1987 
through December 31, 1990, the support price was set 
at $11.10 /cwt. After December 31, 1987, the support 
price was subject to 50 cents per hundredweight 
reduction on January 1 each year if projected CCC 
removals exceeded 5 billion pounds. The 50 cent drop 
occurred January 1, 1987. 
DurIng the last half of 1987, Congress wrestled with 
various budget-deficit reduction proposals. To meet 
deficit reduction requirements during the last quarter 
1987, the prices the USDA paid for CCC commodities 
were cut 8.5 percent. However, the dairy industry and 
Congress compromised on a 2.5 cent / cwt assessment 
on all producer milk to meet the deficit reduction 
requirements. 
When all the dust settled, milk producers went into 
1988 with a support price of $10.60 and a 2.5 cent 
assessment. Congress and the administration hoped for 
stable or possibly decreasing production for 1988. 
Problems, Goals and Policies of the Future 
Because of lower production and higher consumption, 
USDA net purchases and government costs were lower 
in 1987 than in 1986. Nevertheless, the future is 
uncertain. Prospects through the end of the 1980s are 
that net removals will at best stay at the 1987 level. The 
closer supply-demand balance is clearly an improvement, 
but it is also clear that current policies have not solved 
the long-run problems facing the dairy industry. 
Any number of policy options are available and 
several will be seriously advanced in the debate as the 
current farm bill expires. Some people will support a 
price-oriented program. A few will call for sophisticated 
plans to restructure and centralize management of farm 
supplies. A target price deficiency payment program 
similar to that used for grain and other crop programs 
is endorsed by some people. Other proposals that will 
be debated include regionalized base and surplus 
management schemes, and two tier pricing plans. The 
total elimination of any. support mechanism seems 
unlikely. 
In the following chapters, several alternatives for 
supporting the prices and incomes received by dairy 
farmers are analyzed. They are different not only in the 
way they work but, more importantly, in what they seek 
to accomplish. Policy goals are neither right nor wrong; 
they are based on individual or shared values and 
2. Cost-Pricing 
"If only I could be guaranteed my cost of production 
plus a reasonable profit," is a statement often heard at 
meetings of dairymen and farmers in general. This 
philosophy has led to proposals to adjust the support 
price by means of a revised cost based parity formu 1 a or 
by actual changes in production costs. Such proposals 
may be referred to as "cost-pricing." 
What Is Cost-Pricing? 
The underlying notion of cost-pricing-prices that 
move in general concert with costs-is economically 
and philosophically appealing. Of course, a number of 
factors other than cost of production affect the 
appropriate price level at any given time. But cost-
pricing could be used as the basic support price mover. 
The USDA has used the cost-pricing concept to 
make annua 1 changes in target prices for feed grains 
and wheat. To a degree, some state-controlled milk 
markets use the mechanism today. State milk agencies 
that use the public hearing process consider testimony 
on the cost of producing milk. States such as California, 
Virginia and North Carolina use cost based economic 
formu 1 as to adjust prices paid producers. Key factors 
such as feed costs and labor costs are heavily weighted 
in these formulas. 
If the underlying goals of the support price program 
are to provide an income support and stability for dairy 
farmers, cost-pricing may have a lot to offer. However, 
if the goal is to allow long-term adjustment in the 
industry, cost pricing leaves much to be desired. 
beliefs. Likewise, policy options can only be judged by a 
set of policy goals. Two elements of dairy policy federal 
milk marketing orders and advertising and research 
programs, are not discussed because they are viewed as 
being primarily industry self-help programs. The 
challenge before policy makers after the 1985 farm bill 
expires will be to resist the temptation to legislate 
another compromise that deals with the persistent 
short-run problems, but which fails to face the long-run 
issues. W'ill dairy policy for the next decade seek 
primarily to preserve and protect dairy farm interests 
as they exist today, or will it sacrifice a measure of 
individual protection to promote a greater flexibility 
and adaptability to the technological and economic 
changes that will buffet and challenge the dairy industry 
as it approaches the 21st century? 
Alternative Mechanisms for Implementing 
Two cost-pricing mechanisms have been widely 
discussed in recent years : dairy parity and actual cost of 
production (COP). 
Cost of Production. In 1972, Congress mandated that 
the USDA study and annually update the U.S. average 
costs of producing milk and major field crops. The idea 
was that these cost estimates could be used as a guide 
for setting the level of either price or income supports 
for farmers. 
A number of questions can and should be raised 
about what costs are included in any cost of production 
estimate and how they are measured. Perhaps the most 
important questions concern the treatment of family 
labor, management, capital and home-raised feed costs. 
Dairy Parity. Under the traditional parity procedure, . 
changes in the support price are based on changes in a 
general index of prices paid by farmers relative to a 
general index of prices received by farmers . The dairy 
parity approach simply relates the support price to an 
index of prices paid by dairy farmers to produce milk. 
In other words, the prices-received measure is dropped 
and the prices-paid index is tailored to reflect milk 
production specifically, as opposed to all agricultural 
production. 
The components included in a dairy parity index and 
their relative weights would likely be based on cost of 
production surveys, as is currently the case for USDA's 
prices-paid indices. Even with that guideline, important 
decisions must be made about what should be included 
in the index and how much each item should be 
weighted. A key factor would be whether or not some 
allowance for family living costs should be included or 
whether only the prices of purchased inputs used 
directly to produce milk should be used in the index. 
One of the central issues in dairy parity pricing is 
whether the price ought to be adjusted for changes in 
output per cow. Unless such an adjustment is made, the 
index does not reflect adequately average costs as 
technology changes productivity. 
Consequences of Cost-Pricing 
Compared to some alternatives, cost-pricing is not a 
radical change in the current method of establishing the 
price support. Yet, if implemented properly, it . could 
provide an income floor for producers and reduce the 
possibility of amassing large surpluses in the future. 
Cost-pricing combined with secretarial discretion and/or 
supply-demand adjusters could be even more effective 
in balancing production and consumption. 
The roots of current problems lie in the parity 
formula which was used as the support price mover 
until 1981. The all-agriculture parity formula no longer 
adequately reflects conditions in the dairy sector. The 
75 to 90 percent parity range authorized in 1949 
sufficed for 30 years. But the 80 percent minimum 
mandated in the 1977 Farm Bill did not allow sufficient 
flexibility. This triggered overproduction in the late 
1970s, a condition which persists. 
Parity could still conceivably be used as a price 
adjuster, perhaps with a discretionary range of 45 to 65 
percent. But most believe that it would be better to 
abandon this mechanism. Perhaps use of a cost-pricing 
program would "fine tune" a program that worked 
quite well for 30 years. 
Cost-pricing provides for an automatic price mover. 
Cost-pricing would reflect changes in cost conditions 
within the industry. During the 1970s, when dairy costs 
were escalating much faster than prices, the general 
parity index did not reflect these changes. Conversely, 
in the late 1970s, costs stabilized as the support price 
continued to rise. Cost-pricing would circumvent such 
problems . 
• flt.·, ... · ..
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The true industry average cost may not be acceptable 
to the majority of the producers. This is the case 
because the majority of the milk is produced by the 
largest producers who have lower costs per ewt. The 
average costs thus more closely reflect the cost of a 
small number of large producers rather thaq the large 
number of small and moderate size producers. This 
creates criticism from the majority of the producers 
that the average cost is not high enough. 
Cost-pricing would call for only minor alterations in 
a system of price supports that many believe has 
worked quite well. Other programs, such as production 
controls or target prices, would involve major surgery 
that would completely revamp the philosophy of dairy 
policy. 
Gains in productivity have enabled dairymen to 
offset many input cost increases. With predictions of a 
technological explosion in the dairy sector, there is 
even greater need for efficiency in the price support 
mechanism. Cost-pricing that takes into account changes 
in output per cow would account for such efficiency 
changes. The COP method captures efficiency gains 
made during the production period and would be 
reflected in the next production period. 
Cost-pricing could lead to conflicts between large and 
small producers, between producers in different regions, 
and between producers who own their operations 
outright and those who rent or are highly leveraged. 
While costs are important, they represent only one 
dimension of the appropriate level of milk prices. 
Another equally important aspect is demand. Cost-
pricing ignores the demand side of the price equation. 
This weakness could be overcome by moving to 
economic formula pricing incorporating both cost and 
demand factors, by tying cost-pricing into a supply-
demand adjuster or by giving the Secretary a measure of 
discretion. 
Finally, cost-pricing would not mean a stable price. 
Grain prices are expected to continue to fluctuate 
widely and, because feed accounts for almost half of 
cash milk production costs, support prices would rise 
and fall in conjunction with grain prices. 
" ; ... 
3. Supply-Demand Adjuster Pricing 
Supply-demand adjuster prtcmg is a systematic 
procedure for adjusting the dairy support price on the 
basis of market conditions. The adjuster is sometimes 
called a "trigger" mechanism for making a price support 
change. The measure of supply-demand conditions used 
to adjust the support price would likely be the quantity 
of Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) purchases of 
dairy products. The price adjustment schedule would be 
geared either to the quantity of purchases acquired in 
the preceding market year, those projected for the 
forthcoming market year, or some combination. The 
dairy program authorized by the 1985 Farm Bill 
implemented a type of supply-demand adjuster. 
In a qualitative sense, the dairy support price has 
almost always been adjusted in light of supply and 
demand conditions for milk. The Agricultural Act of 
1949 called for flexible price supports in the range of 75 
to 90 percent of parity with "adequate supply" specified 
as the adjustment criterion. For many years, the 15-
point parity range permitted the Secretary to make 
adjustments to the dairy support price, even though no 
schedule was stated. 
One of the simplest methods to track supply and 
demand changes are the government purchases through 
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) of dairy 
products in the operation of the support program. 
Through the CCC, the USDA is authorized to buy from 
processors products for which there is no readily 
available commercial market. As CCC purchases increase, 
it is assumed a surplus of milk is developing. In order to 
discourage production of the surplus milk, the USDA 
can lower the support price. The lowering of the 
support price is intended to persuade unprofitable 
operators to leave milk production, and discourage new 
investment by those not already producing milk. 
The 1985 Food Security Act contained a provision 
tying support price changes to potential (CCC) product 
removals . If for any of the calendar years 1988, 1989, 
and 1990 CCC removals or expected removals exceed 5 
billion pounds milk equivalent, the Secretary of 
Agriculture ,~ould drop the support price 50¢ /per cwt. 
If the expected removals were less than 2.5 billion 
pounds then the support price is increased 50¢ . 
(Example 1) 
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Example 1. Calendar Year Supply-Demand Adjuster 
in 1985 Food Security Act 
Projected 
CCC Purchases 
(Milk Equivalent) 
(billion pounds) 
2.5 or less 
greater than 2.5 
but less than 5.0 
5.0 or more 
Supply-Demand 
Price Adjustment 
cents per hundredweight 
+ 50 cen.ts 
no change in price 
- 50 cents 
Any schedule should: 1) include both plus and minus 
price adjustments, 2) reflect price adjustments that are 
large enough to have significant effects on the supply-
demand situation, and 3) be sufficiently detailed that 
the schedule is a sensitive measure of the supply of milk 
relative to demand as measured by CCC purchases. 
(Example 2) 
Example 2. A Hypothetical Supply-Demand Adjuster 
Schedule 
CCC Purchases 
(Milk Equivalent) 
o 
1.25 billion pounds 
2.5 
3.13 
3.75 
4.38 
5.0 
6.25 
7.5 billion pounds 
Supply-Demand 
Price Adjuster 
+ 9 percent 
+ 6.75 percent 
+ 4.5 percent 
- 2.25 percent 
o 
- 2.25 percent 
- 4.5 percent 
- 6.75 percent 
- 9.0 percent 
The two critical decisions in setting up a schedule 
are: 
• The level of CCC purchases at which no price 
adjustment is called for. 
• The amount of price adjustment for a given change 
in CCC purchases relative to this base level. 
There are a number of ways a supply-demand adjuster 
schedule can be used. The two primary ways are: 
1) Without an automatic price mover 
2) With an automatic price mover 
Without an Automatic Support Price Mover. By this 
system, the support price is not tied to any kind of a 
mover such as parity or cost of production. 
It moves only in relation to changes called for by the 
quantity of CCC purchases. For example, assume that 
the support price is $11.10 per ewt. Also, assume that 
projected CCC purchases for the year beginningJ anuary 
1 are estimated to be 5 billion pounds of milk equivalent. 
In this situation, the supply-demand adjuster calls for a 
$0.50 per ewt reduction in the support price on January 
1. Similarly, on January 1 the following year, if CCC 
purchases were projected to be less than 2.5 billion 
pounds milk equivalent, the support price would be 
increased by $0.50 per ewt. 
The most serious criticism of using a supply-demand 
adjuster without an automatic price mover is that the 
support price is adjusted exclusively in relation to 
market conditions. No philosophy undergirds the 
support price other than that government purchases 
should be within a given range. A secondary concern is 
that the forecasted level of production is a product of 
the forecaster. Forecasters' predictions vary and can be 
politically motivated. The supply-demand adjuster would 
provide dairy farmers with a degree of price stability, 
but not as much price security as a cost-pricing 
procedure. 
With an Automatic Support Price Mover. With this 
type of program, a supply-demand adjuster would be 
used in conjunction with an automatic price mover. 
Consider the following example using a dairy specific 
parity index or a cost of production change as the 
automatic price mover. Assume again that the support 
price is $11 .10 per cwt. Further assume that the factors 
in the cost-pricing mover indicate that the new support 
price should be increased to $11.54. Now, the current 
supply-demand adjuster would be applied to the revised 
price of $11.54. With projected CCC purchases at 5.5 
billion pounds, the support price would be adjusted 
$0.50 per cwt downward. Thus, the new support price 
would be $11.04 per ewt. 
Using a supply-demand adjuster in conjunction with 
an automatic price mover acknowledges that no auto-
matic price mover ever has been or ever will be perfect. 
For example, cost-pricing may reflect supply changes, 
but it cannot capture demand changes. If one does not 
want the Secretary of Agriculture to make adjustments 
on a judgment basis, then the use of a supply-demand 
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adjuster is an appropriate option. It is superior to 
secretarial discretion insofar as it brings a clearly 
understood systematic adjustment to the price support 
decision. 
Consequences of Supply-Demand Adjusters 
Several conditi<;ms or factors rationalize tht:; adoption 
of a supply-demand adjuster mechanism :' to affect 
support prices. 
• In the absence of production controls, some type of a 
market limit to the support price is essential. A 
supply-demand adjuster can provide such a limit. 
• A supply-demand adjuster may reduce the influence 
of secretarial discretion or political pressure. Also, 
the logic of a supply-demand adjuster could be a 
buffer against political efforts to adjust the support 
price. 
• The supply-demand adjuster has an explicit market 
orientation that can help facilitate resource allocation 
without sacrificing price stability. 
• The supply-demand adjuster is cost sensitive with 
respect to the CCC purchase program for dairy 
products . Both the quantity of purchases and 
product purchase prices would be affected by the 
price adjustment. 
• Adjustments to the support price because of supply-
demand adjustments may receive broad acceptance 
because they could be anticipated, and their 
rationale would have general pre-agreement. The 
entire dairy industry would be familiar with the 
mechanism and would know what to expect in a 
forthcoming price support decision. 
• Supply-demand adjusters are not without controversy. 
Analysts differ on their estimates of forthcoming 
CCC purchases. Political pressures can be brought 
to bear on these estimates-particularly when they 
are close to triggering a price change. 
Implementation of a supply-demand adjuster would 
fine tune the way that things have been done. It is 
intended to help prices more closely reflect market 
conditions and to avoid the surplus milk or price 
instability problems generated when support prices are 
allowed to become far out of synch with the market. 
To the extent that supply and demand conditions 
must be recognized in establishing the support price, 
the adjuster mechanism provides an objective and 
effective means of making such adjustments. In the 
absence of production controls, some formal or informal 
type of supply-demand adjuster to the support price is 
essential. 
4. Voluntary Production Controls 
For most of agriculture, efforts to control production 
have been voluntary. Beginning in 1983 with the 
diversion program, the dairy termination program was 
the second time a voluntary program was used to 
control milk prod~ction. Voluntary controls thus far 
have been implemented with mixed success in the dairy 
sector. This experience has not been much different 
than for crop programs. 
What Is a Voluntary Controls Policy? 
A voluntary controls policy provides economic 
incentives to dairymen who agree either to reduce their 
marketings or to terminate production. This differs 
from mandatory programs where dairymen are required 
by law to maintain marketings or production below a 
specified level or receive a very low price for excess 
production. Voluntary programs with incentives have 
been more acceptable politically than mandatory pro-
grams with penalties. 
When a program is voluntary, participation depends 
upon the size of the economic incentive relative to the 
requirements for compliance. Voluntary programs use 
bases to measure compliance of individual dairymen 
and to reward producers for compliance. Legislative 
action could either mandate the program on some well-
defined, automatic base such as average production over 
the past 3 to 5 years or provide discretionary authority 
to the Secretary of Agriculture for its implementation. 
Voluntary supply control policies in agriculture have 
been used extensively since the 1960s. For example, to 
qualify for deficiency payments, loan rates or the 
farmer-owned grain reserve, grain farmers have been 
required to set aside or retire land from production in 
most years since 1978. For dairy, a voluntary supply 
control program was authorized by the controversial 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982. Producers 
could receive a refund of the second 50-cent assessment 
if they reduced their milk marketings by a specified 
amount below their base. The milk divers i_on program 
of the Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983 
provided payments for a 15-month period (January 1, 
1984 through March 31,1985) to those producers who 
contracted wJth USDA to reduce their marketings from 
5 to 30 perce'nt below their base. 
The Dairy Termination Program authorized in the 
1985 Farm Bill provided payments to the dairy producer 
to refrain from milk production for 5 years and slaughter 
or export of the producer's entire dairy herd. 
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Voluntary production controls make sense only when 
supplies exceed commercial demand by a sizable amount, 
Moreover, they are most likely to be necessary when 
attempts are made to support the price of milk at a 
level that supports farm prices and income, 
Alternative Mechanisms for Implementing 
The alternative mechanisms for providing some type 
of economic incentive to dairymen to reduce their 
supply include incentives to cull cows, market less milk, 
or retire whole farms indefinitely with no option to 
return to dairying at some later date. 
Cull Cow Programs. Milk production may be reduced 
through incentive payments to producers to cull more 
cows than they would normally. For example, dairymen 
could be paid $300 by the USDA for each additional 
cull. To eliminate the 16 billion pounds of milk surplus 
(12 percent of farm marketings) that existed in 1983 
would have required a drop in the nation's dairy herd of 
almost 2 million head. An even greater number of 
additional cows may need to be culled to reduce the 
herd by this amount if one takes into account the record 
level of replacement heifers. 
Three major concerns have been expressed about a cull 
cow program: 
• A large-scale cull program could be difficult to 
monitor and verify. 
• Increased culling suppresses beef prices. About 20 
percent of the beef supply comes from dairy cattle 
and about 35 to 38 million head of beef cattle are 
slaughtered annually. Two or three million more cull 
dairy cows added to this total depresses beef prices 
in the short run. However, in the long run a reduced 
dairy herd eventually leads to fewer culled dairy cows ' 
and dairy calves to be fed out as dairy beef. 
• Cull cow programs do not guarantee that milk 
production will be reduced, nor do they measure 
producer performance relative to milk production. It 
is simply assumed that greater culling will lead to 
lower production. 
Milk Diversion Program. Milk diversion programs use 
incentive payments to encourage dairymen to reduce or 
not increase their milk marketings. Reduction can be 
achieved through cow culling, lower production per 
cow or increased farm use of milk. Reductions are 
measured from a historical base such as the past 2 or 3 
years. The milk diversion program was an example of 
this type of program, although it is not the only 
example when one considers all the specific variations 
that could be made. 
V nder the milk diversion program, producers who 
agreed to reduce marketings from 5 to 30 percent below 
their base received $10 per hundredweight for the 
difference. Typically, producers who purchase all their 
feed and use hired labor find it easier to make 
adjustments and participate in voluntary diversion 
programs. 
Diversion programs only temporarily reduce pro-
duction. Once the program ends, producers are normally 
geared up to resume or even increase production above 
pre-diversion levels. That was clearly the experience 
with the 1983 dairy diversion program. 
Whole Farm Buyout or Termination. A voluntary 
supply control program also could provide payments 
for the comp"lete retirement of milk producing farms. 
One advantage of whole farm retirement is that the 
entire dairy production unit is eliminated. Moreover, 
whole farm retirement obligates the retired unit to 
remain out of dairy production for a given number of 
years. 
The Dairy Termination Program was a voluntary 
program for producers where the federal government 
paid producers to leave production, dispose of milking 
herds and refrain from producing milk for 5 years. 
V nder the provisions of the program, producers 
established a marketing base which was an average of 
marketings for the years 1981-1985, adjusted for partial 
production years. Potential program participants sub-
mitted up to three bids to the government. The bids 
were the amounts in dollars per hundredweight the 
producer was willing to receive for the marketing base. 
If the producer's bid was accepted, the producers were 
paid the total amount of bid times base. The producer 
contracted with the Secretary of Agriculture to refrain 
from producing milk for 5 years. The producer promised 
to prevent the production facility from being used for 
milk production. Additionally, the producer was required 
to slaughter or export all dairy cows. 
As a result of the program, about 14,000 milk 
producers removed almost 1 million milk cows from 
the V.S . milking herd between March 1, 1986 and 
August 31, 1987. Despite this large reduction in the 
milking herd, production in 1987 was less than 1 
percent below 1986. Nonparticipants increased pro-
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duction in response to what apparently was interpreted 
to be favorable future economic conditions. 
Consequences of Voluntary Controls 
Voluntary supply control programs can be devised to 
achieve significant reductions in total milk marketings 
in times of surpluses. This could result in hig~er prices 
to dairymen and would reduce costs to the government. 
Although voluntary supply control programs can 
help maintain stable prices, they would not be econom-
ically effective in maintaining higher than market 
clearing prices over the long run. To the extent that 
producer prices may be held above market clearing 
levels, consumer prices for milk and dairy products also 
would be higher and more stable. 
Government costs of voluntary supply control pro-
grams depend upon the type of producer incentives or 
payments and the extent of producer " participation. If 
incentives or diversion payments are too attractive, 
producer participation may be larger than desirable. A 
provision giving the Secretary of Agriculture the 
authority to tailor the size of incentives to control the 
level of participation may be useful. 
Problems of geographic milk shortages have occurred 
with voluntary supply controls. For example, producer 
participation in both the milk diversion program and 
Dairy Termination Program was greatest in the south. 
As a result, a very tight fluid milk supply developed in 
the south and southeast during the summer and fall. 
Fluid milk from outside the area was purchased at 
relatively higher prices to meet the needs of fluid milk 
processors. Thus, a voluntary supply reduction program, 
particularly a voluntary program, could misallocate 
resources in milk production, making it difficult for 
some high fluid milk utilization markets to obtain 
sufficient supplies of Grade A milk for beverage needs. 
Higher consumer prices for beverage milk in these 
markets also would result. 
Like any program that raises producer returns, 
frequent use of voluntary programs could encourage the 
inclusion of program benefits in the price of dairy cows. 
Experience thus far indicates voluntary programs are 
not fully effective because they are either not well 
enforced or cannot be fully enforced. Cases of cow 
trading under the diversion and termination programs 
have been documented. The more experience farmers 
have with voluntary programs, the better they are at 
subverting them. 
5. Mandatory Production Controls 
One way to reduce the government's dairy program 
costs would be to limit production on a farm-by-farm 
basis. Such a program could cause major changes in 
milk pricing, milk production levels, farm earnings and 
farm costs. . 
What Are Mandatory Controls? 
Mandatory production controls set quantitative limits, 
or quotas, on how much milk can be marketed by each 
dairy farm. Such quotas usually are set in reference to a 
farm's historic production level. Under such a plan, any 
milk produced over the allocated quota would be priced 
at far below the cash costs of milk production. 
This type of proposal is often referred to as two-tier 
pricing because of the tremendous difference between 
the quota price and the over-quota price. For example, 
under such a program, the quota price could be set at 
$15 per cwt while the over-quota price is set at $1 per 
cwt. The difference between these two prices eliminates 
the incentive to produce over-quota milk because the 
price is less than the extra cost of producing the milk. 
In some proposals, producers would face legal penalties 
for over-quota marketing. 
Alternative Mechanisms for Implementing 
When implementing a quota plan, fairness is always 
a difficult issue. To prevent a production increase by 
farmers trying to acquire more quota, such plans are 
established using old production levels. Accordingly, 
many farmers will present reasons why they deserve a 
larger allocation of quota. A board of dairy farmers, or 
some other mechanism, could be established to review 
these requests . However, if too many exemptions are 
granted, the entire quota plan will collapse. 
Allocation of new quota could be limited to regions 
that experience growth in Class I (fluid) milk markets. 
This new quota could be allocated to existing producers 
or to new producers seeking to enter dairy farming. 
However, all such new allocations of quota will be small 
relative to the magnitude of requests for new quota-
particularly i.f dairying is profitable. 
" 
A propoSal by Senator Leahy would divide the 
United States into milk producing regions based on 
marketing orders and historical distribution patterns 
and allot a portion of a base level surplus purchased by 
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to each 
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region. If CCC surplus purchases above the region's 
base level develop, producers in the region would be 
assessed on the surplus CCC sales to bring milk 
production down. 
Under the proposal, regions could not dump their 
surplus into another region. The Secretary of Agriculture 
would monitor milk shipments to determine if surplus 
dumping is occurring. There are several issues that 
must be resolved in this type of plan. The primary issue 
is what constitutes "dumping." One interpretation is 
only milk shipped out of region and sold as products to 
the CCc. A second interpretation is that dumping 
would occur when manufactured products produced and 
sold within or without region of origin displace products 
from another region in the commercial market, forcing 
"product displacement" and increased CCC shipments 
from the other region. 
Either interpretation is incongruent with the pro-
gressive move toward a national market for dairy 
products. The plan would avoid recognizing the regional 
shifts occurring in milk production because of changes 
in the cost structure of producing milk. Such a plan 
could hinder continuing trends toward efficient market 
organization and product movements across markets. 
The second interpretation of the plan would go further 
in freezing production patterns, thus maintaining the 
status quo. 
Conditions Fostering Mandatory Controls 
When milk support prices are above the long run 
cost of production, capital and management resources 
will be invested in milk production. If the support price 
is lowered, the resources invested in milk production 
will not be moved out of milk production as fast as they . 
are moved in. In the short run, some producers will 
continue to increase milk production, actually exacer-
bating an oversupply situation and encouraging further 
price cuts. Eventually, a mass exodus of producers and 
resources from milk production occurs. As milk supplies 
diminish, prices increase and the cycle repeats itself. 
The desire to maintain an adequate supply of milk at 
stable prices was the impetus for initiating a price 
support program for milk. However, technological and 
managerial progress translate into the need for fewer 
dairy producers and a smaller national milking herd. 
This adjustment sometimes occurs faster than producers 
and policymakers can tolerate. Therefore, sometimes as 
a matter of political and social choice it is desirable to 
maintain or ease the decline in producer numbers. 
Mandatory controls then become an alternative policy 
consideration when it is desirable to maintain higher 
than market clearing prices, or to provide a price level 
necessary to maintain a certain group of producers in 
the production system without encouraging surplus 
milk production. Regional shifts in population, regional 
differences in production costs, uneven and sudden 
shifts in regional demands have exacerbated milk 
production resource shifts. These and other types of 
changes in market structure encourage support for 
mandatory supply controls to preserve the status quo. 
Regional changes in production costs and the structure 
of the dairy industry have resulted in political pressures 
to reduce, isolate or reverse the forces of change on 
traditional milk production regions. This is the origin 
of proposals such as the Leahy plan. The choice is 
between allowing economic forces to work their way 
out or seeking a government policy alternative which 
sacrifices industry efficiency but eases the pain of 
structural change. 
Consequences of Mandatory Controls 
The implementation of mandatory controls would 
substantially reduce government costs now and in the 
future. Those farmers who received a production base 
would have their future profitability practically guaran-
teed. In the view of many dairy farmers, this guarantee 
is the main appeal of the quota plan. However, as a 
consequence, farmers would lose their freedom to risk 
expanding their milk production. 
Consumers would pay more for dairy products than 
they would without a quota. Some consumers might 
consider the price of milk to be unreasonably high. As a 
result, dairy products would have a more difficult time 
competing against other foods and beverages for a 
share of the consumers' dollar. It would also speed the 
acceptance of substitute dairy products made from 
casein and soybean proteins. Thus, an incentive would 
be created for the further tightening of quotas and 
import controls. 
Past experience with quotas shows that they may not 
always reduce production to the extent desired. Any 
time the over-quota price exceeds the extra cost of 
expanding production, there are incentives to expand. 
In addition, if producers anticipate an opportunity to 
expand base, incentives are present to increase 
production. 
A decision would have to be made concerning the 
transferability of quota from producer to producer. If 
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no transfers are allowed and the quota is tied to the 
farm, inefficient farms will have little opportunity to 
grow. The tobacco program is a classic example of how 
quotas discourage development of large efficient units. 
The quota will take on a capitalized value. Even if no 
transfers are allowed, all farms will have a market value 
far in excess of their production value becau'se of the 
existence of quota. On the other hand, if transfers are 
allowed, the quota itself will acquire an asset value. In 
either case, the creation of quota can be viewed as a tax 
levied by the present generation of dairy farmers upon 
consumers and acts as a barrier to entry by the future 
generation of dairy farmers. 
The implementation of a quota plan would cause 
interregional tensions. The producers in each region 
almost would know that their own economic situation 
would be improved only if the production of another 
region were forcibly reduced. In this environment, 
producer energies are no longer focused on the future 
health of the entire dairy industry. Instead, the focus 
becomes their own percentage share of the economic 
pie. Progress and cooperation become difficult. Any 
type of regionalization of a mandatory quota tends to 
lock in historical production patterns, perpetuating and 
exacerbating regional production utilization imbalances. 
The tobacco program, and the Canadian Quota program 
are two examples of this perpetuation of regional 
imbalance. 
A national quota plan could not reduce regional 
production in exact conformity with regional demand. 
Therefore, in regions where production is reduced 
below consumption, milk movement between regions 
becomes more important than in earlier times when 
surplus production was common. 
To induce milk movement to market, milk prices 
might be increased in deficit regions. Hence, farmers in 
these regions would then be able to profitably buy quota 
from farmers in surplus regions. On the other hand, 
quota purchases could flow in the opposite direction if 
surplus area producers did not receive a low enough 
price for their milk. Either way, this would eventually 
fuel interregional tensions over the fairness of national 
quota plan. 
On the brighter side, quotas do provide a means of 
increasing producer returns and stabilizing industries' 
conditions in the event of chronic overproduction 
problems. The adverse effects of quotas are most 
pronounced when they are applied stringently, are 
inflexible to industry change, are not negotiable, and 
are used to mutually enhance producer returns. 
6. Cost-Sharing Programs 
While most people recognize the need for govern-
ment involvement in the dairy industry, many would 
like to see dairymen assume greater responsibility for 
controIling government program costs and stabilizing 
milk production. This objective has been achieved 
through the implementation of cost-sharing programs. 
What Are Cost-Sharing Programs? 
Under a cost-sharing program, dairymen as a matter 
of public policy are required to pay for a portion of the 
cost of operating the milk price support program. Cost-
sharing or assessment programs have been used during 
the period 1983 through 1988 as a means of defraying a 
portion of the cost of the diversion program, termina-
tion program, and price support operations. 
Cost-sharing programs have a primary goal of 
reducing government costs associated with dairy pro-
grams. Increasingly, the beneficiaries of government 
programs are being asked to pay for a proportion of 
their costs. The results have been the initiation of user 
fees on a wide range of government services. Farmers 
view such fees as a tax that is to be resisted unless the 
loss of the program is at stake. However, the program 
also may be viewed as a producer self-help program 
whereby government assists in achieving program 
objectives such as enhancing producer income while 
maintaining a supply-demand balance. 
Alternative Mechanisms for Implementing 
Cost-sharing programs can be used to meet the dual 
objectives of controlling program costs and stabilizing 
milk production in three ways: 
• The assessment could be used strictly to pay for a 
portion of the cost of operating the milk price support 
program. In contrast to a fixed assessment, it could be 
variable, rising when program costs are high and 
falling or even being eliminated when program costs 
are low. The assessment could be implemented only 
when program costs rose above a certain level-say 
$500 million. Operated in this manner, the assessment 
would, in effect, automaticaIly lower the milk price 
support level; much like supply-demand adjuster pricing. 
• The assessment could be an incentive for production 
adjustment. The Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 
1983 accomplished this by utilizing the 50-cent assess-
ment to pay dairymen who reduced the production 
from their base at the rate of $10 per ewt. The milk 
diversion program, in effect, transferred income from 
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the nonparticipants to the participants-that is, from 
those who did not volunteer to reduce production to 
those who did. Another form of this program, in effect 
only from September through November 1983, refunded 
a second 50 cents per ewt deduction only to those 
producers who reduced their production by 8.4 percent. 
The 1985 Farm BiIl authorized a 50 cent assessment 
to help pay producers who agreed to terminate. 
Gramm-Rudman provisions were met by the dairy 
sector through a 2.5 cent assessment on milk marketed 
by producers. 
• The assessment could pay for the cost of Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) inventory management; 
production adjustment; and demand-expanding product 
development, advertising and research program com-
ponents. Such a package might be viewed as the 
application of a government-industry market manage-
ment concept. In such a self-help concept, a national 
hearing could determine decisions on the appropriate 
combination of support price level; CCC inventory 
policies; production adjustment incentives; and product 
development, advertising and research expenditures. 
Assessments require a mechanism for coIlecting and 
disbursing funds. In the milk diversion program, states 
blanketed by a federal milk marketing order effectively 
utilized these offices as a source of information on 
production and a mechanism for coIlection of the 
assessment. Diversion program experience suggested 
the need for complete information and regulatory 
activity in Grade B milk producing areas such as 
Minnesota and Wisconsin. Those developments 
suggested the need for and desirability of close 
coordination between and/or consolidation of the 
administration of all milk programs into a single 
USDA agency. 
Consequences of Cost-Sharing 
Without production controls, cost-sharing aIlows the 
effective milk price support level to adjust automaticaIly 
to the market clearing level. Therefore, if the price 
support is initiaIly set above the market clearing level, 
the assessment wiIl reduce producer returns without 
affecting the prices paid by processors or consumers. 
Prices would be more stable than in the free market 
because the government would stiIl be buying surplus 
dairy products. However, producer returns would faIl 
when program costs increase and producer assessments, 
thereby, rise. 
If the assessment is used to control production, 
producer returns are redistributed in favor of those who 
control production. Product prices would rise if controls 
were effective in reducing government stocks to 
acceptable working levels or lower. Processing cooper-
atives and other handlers would thereby run the risk of 
periodic short supplies resulting from misjudgments in 
the degree of control exercised. However, the less harsh 
production adjustment option of returning a portion of 
the checkoff to producers who do control production 
may avoid some of these overadjustment problems. 
The cost-sharing option that integrates inventory 
management, production control and demand-expansion 
programs into a single package offers substantial 
potential for stabilizing the industry while taking 
measures to expand product demand. Questions, 
however, arise as to whether the quantity of regulatory 
activity involved is too great to perform effectively and 
efficiently. Past experience with high levels of regula-
tion, both within and outside the dairy industry, confirms 
this concern. 
Cost-sharing programs reduce production incentives 
without affecting market prices for milk and ~he value 
of products in storage. When a surplus condition is 
expected to be temporary, assessment may be the least 
disruptive means of accomplishing a production 
reduction. 
Cost-sharing programs may be more expensive to 
society than simply allowing the free market to determine 
the price of milk. However, such programs could be 
justified on the grounds of the need to avoid the 
instability of free market price and income and to 
produce an overall reduction in direct government 
program costs. 
7. Target Prices - Deficiency Payments 
Since it began in 1949, the dairy price support 
program has worked so smoothly in most years that we 
tend to forget that there are other ways of achieving 
dairy policy objectives. An alternative to purchasing 
manufactured products to support farm prices would be 
a target price-deficiency payments program. 
What Are Target Prices? 
Basically, a target price-deficiency payments program 
is one in which direct payments or deficiency payments 
would be made to milk producers. Since there would 
not be a Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) purchase 
program for butter, cheese and nonfat dry milk, 
wholesale product market prices would adjust to 
market-clearing levels. Producer milk prices would 
quickly reflect such adjustments. The amount of payment 
is the difference between the target price and the 
prevailing market price for producer milk. 
Consider the following example of deficiency pay-
ments emphasizing the contrast with the present CCC 
purchase program. Assume that the purchase program 
is in operation, the support price for milk is $10.60 0.5 
percent butterfat), and CCC purchase prices are $1.32 
per pound for butter, $1.11 per pound for cheese, and 
73 cents per pound for nonfat dry milk. Further assume 
that given these circumstances, the Minnesota-Wiscon-
sin (M-W) manufacturing milk price for a given month 
is $11.12 per ewt. 
If the CCC purchase program had been replaced with 
a deficiency payments program for that same month, 
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let us assume the following responses would have 
occurred: 
• The $10.60 support price now becomes a $10.60 
target price. 
• In the absence of CCC purchases, wholesale prices 
for (a) butter drop 12 cents a pound, (b) cheese drop 
10 cents a pound, and (c) nonfat dry milk drop 6 
cents a pound. 
• As a result of the price declines in product markets, 
the M-W price for the month falls to $10.12, a full $1 
lower than the $11.12 reported under a purchase 
program. 
• With the competitive market price at $10.12 and a 
designated target price of $10.60, a deficiency payment 
of 48 cents per ewt would be made to producers, not 
to processors. 
Alternative Mechanisms for Implementing 
The target price for milk could be identical to the 
support price. It could be established by the same 
procedure, whether that be dairy parity, cost of 
production or some other standard. 
Deficiency payments could be designed not just as a 
means of supporting farm income in the dairy sector, 
adjusting milk production and enhancing the compet-
itive market position of dairy products. In the feed 
grains program, for example, deficiency payments are 
used as incentives to participate in acreage reduction 
programs. In dairy, deficiency payments could be made 
available only to those producers who voluntarily agree 
to reduce marketings a certain percentage from a base, 
or in a mandatory program could be refused to milk 
producers who fail to limit marketings to an amount 
below their base. Some combination of deficiency 
payments and supply controls could allow higher target 
prices than deficiency payments without supply controls 
because program costs would be more effectively 
controlled. 
In a similar vein, deficiency payments could be 
limited or targeted to specific groups. Where deficiency 
payments have been used for other commodities, a 
$50,000 payment limit per farm has been specified. 
With a payment limit, larger dairy operations with 
production levels that exceed the limit would be at a 
disadvantage. At the same time, milk production on 
smaller and possibly less efficient dairy farms might 
increase in response to the payments. 
Another possibility would be to extend deficiency 
payments only to milk used for manufacturing. About 
40 percent of the U.S. milk supply is utilized in 
beverage milk products (Class 1) so savings would be 
proportional. Class I prices could be established by 
adding Class I differentials to the target price rather 
than the market clearing M-W price. Thus, producers 
in fluid milk markets would receive deficiency payments 
only on Class III milk and would get the full Class I 
price on Class I usage. This transfers part of the cost of 
farm income supports from taxpayers to fluid milk 
consumers. There would be a period when Class I prices 
would be much higher than normal relative to Class III 
prtces. 
Consequences of Deficiency Payments 
Target prices would allow the market for dairy 
products to clear and the resulting lower prices could 
provide a significant boost to milk and dairy product 
sales in the long run. The deficiency payments program 
would permit products to move through markets on a 
supply-demand basis. In contrast, under the current 
program CCC purchase prices hold wholesale prices up 
and thereby weaken demand for manufactured products. 
Also, the price advantage that some substitutes for 
dairy products now enjoy would be reduced substantially. 
Closely linked to the demand stimulus that market 
clearing prices might generate would be new incentives 
to promote, merchandise and market dairy products. 
The easy option of selling to the CCC would no longer 
exist. Proprietary firms and dairy cooperatives would 
be challenged to aggressively seek sales in competitive 
markets. Without an automatic government market 
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energies would be directed at expanding demand. 
Exporting dairy products without direct subsidies would 
be possible, although the target price would be 
challenged in trade negotiations as an indirect subsidy. 
The deficiency payments approach would link dairy 
price policy more closely to overall agricultural policy in 
the U.S. Critics say the dairy program in recent years 
has gone its own way-high price supports, purchases, 
and no supply discipline. Deficiency payments have 
been a basic tool for cotton, wheat and feed grains since 
the early 1970s. By adopting deficiency payments, the 
dairy sector could become an integral part of a more 
unified agricultural price-income policy. 
A final consideration might be that target prices can 
achieve the price-income goals of the dairy program 
more reliably than CCC purchases. For example, in the 
1981 through mid-1984 period, the competitive M-W 
price was usually below the support price by 20 to 30 
cents per ewt. A deficiency payments program would 
not be subject to that kind of slippage because the 
difference between the target price and the market 
price would be measured directly and payments to 
farms would be made accordingly. 
In the same way that CCC purchases ran into trouble 
because of high program costs from 1981 to 1983, the 
deficiency payments approach is also vulnerable on a 
cost basis. For example, if 48-cent-per-ewt payments 
were issued for annual marketings of milk of 143 
billion pounds, the dairy program would cost almost 
$684 million. When annual milk production is large, 
market clearing prices would be pushed to lower levels 
and deficiency payments would move to high and costly 
levels. As was discussed earlier, program costs can be 
reduced by limiting payments or by transferring some 
of the cost back to consumers, as in the form of higher 
prices for Class I milk. 
A very important short run concern has to do with 
the disruption of the manufactured dairy products 
industry. The CCC purchase program is so institution-
alized that processors of cheddar cheese, butter and 
nonfat dry milk would face major adjustments if 
purchases were abruptly terminated. The nonfat dry 
milk market in particular, the butter market to a lesser 
degree, and even the cheese market on occasion have 
become dependent on the CCC as a residual buyer. 
Dairy cooperatives have taken on much of the 
responsibility for handling excess milk supplies in 
recent years, so they would be challenged to move 
products commercially and obtain prices for these 
products that would not disadvantage their members. If 
a deficiency payments program were adopted, CCC 
purchases would be phased out or significantly reduced. 
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